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  The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  investigate  the  impact  of  some  corporate  governance 
mechanisms  on  information  asymmetry.  From  among  different  mechanisms  of  corporate 
governance, the number of board members who were not responsible, ownership concentration 
and the percentage of institutional ownership are considered. Time scale of the study includes 
the years from 2005 to 2011. Sampling was performed among all the companies accepted in 
Tehran  Stock  Exchange  using  systematic  removal  method.  This  sample  includes  504 
companies-years.  This  is  a  post-event  study.  Experimentally,  this  study  lies  in  accounting 
proving  research  areas  and  it  is  based on  financial  statements  of  the firms,  and  regarding 
purpose is application. Descriptive method has been used in this study. The findings show that 
there was a positive and significant relationship between the number of board members who are 
not responsible and the percentage of institutional ownership from the one side, and information 
asymmetry from the other. In addition, the findings show a negative significant relationship 
between ownership concentration and information asymmetry.  
 
        © 2014 Growing Science Ltd.  All rights reserved.  
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the influential factors in investment decisions is to have appropriate and new information. 
Since the required  information  is  asymmetrically distributed  among people, it can  cause  various 
results about one subject. Therefore, this information is important for decision makers and the quality 
of  distributing  information  should  be  accurately  evaluated  (Ghaemi  &  Vatanparast,  2005). 
Information asymmetry in  economic  sciences  is  considered  as  an  economic  system  based  on 
incomplete information; i.e., a system in which some people have more information than others, and 
have  information  advantage (Spence et  al., 1970). It  may  influence  the  firm’s  performance,  and, 
hence,  to  solve  this  problem,  it  is  assumed  that as  corporate  governance  is  stronger  in  general, 
information asymmetry will be less.   1830
Corporate governance is a term that one or two decades ago, except for a few of researchers and 
stakeholders, had no meaning for others, but is now a major concern and a main argument for the 
Board of  the  company,  the  university and political talks all  over  the  world. Some incidents  and 
several  important  trends  led  to  growing  interest  of  communities  towards  corporate  governance 
debate. Following these events, corporate governance became not only a term commonly used by 
researchers,  but also researchers,  policy-makers, and  the  corporate  world anywhere  in  the  world 
identified macroeconomic outcomes, and potential long-term distribution systems and poor corporate 
governance. Many studies indicate that better corporate governance mechanisms may increase quality 
and quantity of information disclosed by firms and reduce asymmetric information. Kanagaretnam et 
al.  (2007)  showed  that  the  company with  strong  corporate  governance  has  lower  information 
asymmetry around the announcement of its profits. On the other hand, based on previous research, 
such as Shleifer and  Vishny (1997) the effective Board was considered the most distinctive  and 
important internal tool for monitoring; the greater the number of members who are not responsible, it 
can be said that more monitoring is applied and thus information asymmetry is less.  Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) call the percentage of institutional stock ownership as an internal lever for control. 
In this study the effect of different mechanisms of corporate governance on information asymmetry is 
investigated. From among mechanisms of corporate governance, three of them namely the number 
of board  members  who are  not  responsible,  ownership concentration and  percentage of selected 
institutional ownership and its impact on information asymmetry are measured. Therefore, in this 
study,  three  main  hypotheses  are  discussed  within  each  the  relationship  between  one  of  the 
mechanisms of corporate governance with information asymmetry is studied. 
 
The results of this study  in Tehran Stock Exchange for the years 2005 to 2011 for a sample of 
companies are  that there  is a  positive  and  significant  relationship between  the  number of  board 
members who are not responsible and the percentage of institutional ownership on the one hand and 
information asymmetry on the other. Results also show a significant negative relationship between 
ownership concentration and information asymmetry. 
 
2. Theoretical Foundations and Literature Review 
 
Spence et al. (1970) are believed to be the first who established a theory on information economic 
known as information asymmetry theory. In economic science, this theory led to the creation of a 
field called economic system based on incomplete information. In the economic system based on 
incomplete  information,  some  people  are  officially  identified  who  have  informational  advantage 
compared with others. Two major types of asymmetric information are adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Adverse selection is a type of asymmetric information, which, in economic system, one or 
more  people  in  contract  or  a  potential  transaction  have  information  advantage  compared  with 
others. Moral hazard is a type of asymmetric information, which, in economic system, one or more 
parties to the contract or transaction can see their demands are done in a trade, but the other side 
cannot  see  the  event.  (Spence  et  al.,  1970).  Akerlof  (1970)  initially  introduced  the  concept  of 
information asymmetry. His idea was that one of the parties has an informational advantage over the 
other. Klein et al. (2002) observed that information asymmetry refers to the concept that individuals 
within  the  company,  like  executives,  have  better  information  on  asset  values  and  investment 
opportunities  as  compared  with  other  market  participants.   According  to  agency  theory,  agency 
problems are built because of the divergence of interests between representatives and employers 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1986; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997;  Miller, 2002). In summary, the asymmetric 
information can be created through  a  conflict  of  interest  between  various  groups  (Morgado  & 
Pindado, 2003). Because many employers cannot completely measure and monitor the behavior of 
the agents (managers) (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006), agency costs are created. According to Shleifer and 
Vishny  (1997),  corporate  governance  is  associated  with  methods  in  which  financial  resource H. Salehi et al.  / Management Science Letters 4 (2014) 
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suppliers, regarding appropriate output from their investment, will remain sure. Parkinson's definition 
(1994) is also of the view, which is consistent with agency theory: “corporate governance is the 
process  of  monitoring  and  controlling  to  ensure  the  performance  of  company  director  with  the 
benefits of shareholder”. The other definition implies determining the value added by the firm and its 
allocation among stakeholders who have relationship with firms (Zingales, 1998). The definition of 
Hassasyeganeh (2006) is consistent with the stakeholder’s theory: “corporate governance is laws, 
regulations,  structures,  processes, cultures,  and  systems that contribute  to  achieving  the  goals of 
accountability,  transparency,  justice,  and  the  rights  of  stakeholders”.  This  definition  can  be 
considered as extracts and abstracts of most definitions of corporate governance, which has so far 
been provided. 
 
Corporate governance mechanisms are whereby an indirect and probably incomplete tool in which 
stakeholders (employers) attempt to reduce the  cost of agency through changing the behavior of 
directors who are representatives of the shareholders (Deshmukh, 2005; Kanagartenam et al., 2005, 
2007; Rutherford & Buchholtz, 2007; Chen et al., 2007, 2010). The actions of managers can be 
reduced through reducing information asymmetry in two ways, one directly through incentives and 
the other indirectly through monitoring. Managers, through an incentive by getting rewards disclose 
the  level  of  their  attempts,  which  thus  information  asymmetry  reduces  associating  with  their 
actions. Besides, through regulatory mechanisms such as separating the roles of chairman from CEO 
or increasing the number of directors who are not responsible in the board, information asymmetry 
can be reduced. Regulatory mechanisms are like a window through which shareholders can observe 
the behavior of their managers. Not much research has been executed on the relationship between the 
nature  of  a  firms’  corporate  governance  and  the  degree  of  information  asymmetry. Most  of  the 
evidences achieved in this regard are contradictory. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Perotti and Thadden 
(2003),  Pawlina  and  Renneboog  (2005)  and  Florackis  and  Ozkan  (2009)  reported  that  large 
shareholders could reduce information asymmetry and improve long-term performance. In contrast, 
Heflin and Shaw (2000), O'Neill and Swisher (2003) and Fehle (2004) found that bigger institutional 
ownership was associated with greater information asymmetry. 
 
Many other studies that investigate the relationship between corporate governance and information 
asymmetry  are  usually  concerned  with  limited  characteristics  or  individual corporate governance 
mechanisms.  Hillier and Mac  Kolgan  (2006), Kanagartnam  et al.  (2007) and  Holm  and  Schuler 
(2010)  found  that  board  independence  reduces  information  asymmetry. Peasnell  et  al  (2005) 
expresses  the  opinion  that  the  independence  of  the  board  supports  the  accuracy  of  financial 
statements. Wruck (1993) and Kang et al (2006) investigated the importance of bonus compensation 
for executives in reducing agency problems and lowering information asymmetry. Kay and Scott Lee 
(2010) and Chen et al. (2010) stated that high levels of free cash flow and external financing need 
reducing information asymmetry among firms and strengthening the impact of corporate governance 
practices on the value of the firm. Nouravesh and Ebrahimi Kordlar (2005), in a study, examined the 
relationship  between  institutional  shareholders  and  information  asymmetry. They  reported that  in 
firms with higher institutional ownership, compared with those that have low institutional ownership, 
the prices of stock incorporated more information on future profits. Rahimian et al. (2009) studied the 
relationship between some mechanisms of the corporate governance and information asymmetry in 
firms accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange over period 2004-2009. They reported that there was not 
any significant correlation between internal auditing unit and the ratio of management. However, 
there was a significant negative relationship between the ownership of institutional investors and 
information  asymmetry. Rahmani  et  al.  (2010)  investigated  the  relationship  between  institutional 
ownership and stock liquidity in Iran. They explained that there was a positive significant relationship 
between the ratio of institutional ownership and stock liquidity, and that the institutional ownership 
concentration reduces stock liquidity of companies. The criteria considered to determine information   1832
asymmetry in this study is the domain of the proposed price for buying and selling of stock and the 
model of Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) has been used for its calculation. The difference of proposed 
price for buying and selling roots in unusual supply and demand. Unusual supply and demand are 
created due to the existence of confidential information. At the time of bad confidential news, the 
supply of the stock increases and the proposed price for selling decreases. On the contrary, in case of 
good confidential news, the demand increases and the proposed price for buying  increase too. If 
confidential  information  does  not  exist,  the  effects  of  general  information  by  market-makers  is 
reflected in stock price; that is, the market-makers lead the price towards an appropriate level, as a 
result, unusual sales do not take place (Ghaemi &Vatanparast, 2005)  
  
3. Research Methodology 
 
This is a post-event study. In this research, the purpose is to investigate the relationships among 
variables, and data is collected and analyzed from environment that is to some extend natural or from 
the past events without the interference of the researcher. Experimentally, this research is located in 
accounting fixing research and is based on real information in financial statements of firms; regarding 
the purpose, this study is application. Descriptive method is used in this study. Descriptive research 
included a set of methods whose purpose is to describe examined status or phenomenon.  
In this study, the fundamental issue is to examine the relationship between the  number of board 
members who are not responsible, institutional shareholders ownership and ownership concentration 
with information asymmetry. Therefore, the research hypotheses are as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between the number of board members who are not responsible and 
information asymmetry is significant. 
Hypothesis  2:  The  relationship  between  the  percentage  of  institutional  stock  ownership  and 
information asymmetry is significant. 
Hypothesis  3:  The  relationship  between  ownership  concentration  and  information  asymmetry  is 
significant. 
 
The sample of firms is accepted firms in Tehran Stock Exchange selected through systematic removal 
method. Therefore, from among all the companies accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange, except the 
investment  companies,  banks,  and  insurance  companies,  companies  were  selected that  had  been 
accepted before 2005. In addition, the end of their financial year was the end of March, and during 
the study period had no change in financial  year. Based on these limitations, 72 companies were 
selected as sample. The period is during the years between 2005 and 2011. Data has been collected 
through  observation  and  reviewing  documents  including  financial  statement  information of 
companies and the information concerning the company's stock. In this research, for the formulation 
of the research  literature,  library  method and to  test the  hypothesis,  the  information in financial 
statements and associated notes of companies of Tehran Stock Exchange has been used. 
  
4. Data Analysis  
 
The  main  purpose  is  to  provide  a  model  based  on  accounting  variables  for  prediction,  Pearson 
correlation and multivariate regression to present model are utilized. The following model is used to 
test the hypotheses. 
  
SPREAD i,t = β0 + β1OUTi,t + β2 OWN i,t+  β3 CONCi,t+  β4 SIZE i,t+ β5 SALEi,t+ β6 PROF i,t + β7 
LEVi,t +ε ,   
 
Dependent  variable in  this  model  is  information  asymmetry  stated  as SPREAD.  To  measure 
information asymmetry, the difference between bid and offer prices of shares are used. To do this, the 
following formula is used: H. Salehi et al.  / Management Science Letters 4 (2014) 
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SPREADit = (AP – BP) × 100/(AP + BP)÷2 
 
where SPREAD is the amplitude difference between the price of an offer to buy or sell stocks; AP 
represents the average price of selling company stock; and BP states the average price of an offer to 
buy shares of the company. Independent variables of the model consists of the members of the Board 
who  are  not  responsible  (OUT),  institutional  ownership  (OWN),  and  majority  ownership  or 
ownership  concentration  (CONC High). Institutional  shareholders  include  banks,  insurance 
companies, and investment firms. Institutional shareholders include board member and non-member 
board. Ownership concentration represents the percentage of stocks in the  hands of three first 
main shareholders. Model control variables include firm size (SIZE), sales growth (SALE), financial 
leverage (LEV), and profitability (PROF). Firm size is measured by calculating the natural logarithm 
of  the  value  of  company  assets. Sales  growth,  leverage,  and  profitability  are  calculated  by  the 
following method. 
 
Sales growth= (sales of the current year – sales of the previous year) / sales of previous year  
Financial leverage= long-term debt / total assets  
Profitability= operating cash flow / total assets  
 
 Central indicators and dispersion for research variables for descriptive analysis of the variables are 
determined before testing hypotheses. Mean will be calculated as the most central index with standard 
deviation as the most important distribution indices. Standard deviation shows data scattering. This is 
executed to provide a holistic view of population and the identification. Therefore, the descriptive 
statistics of the variables is included. Descriptive statistics, for the entire year is shown in Table 1 and 
Table 2 shows the results of Pearson correlation coefficient matrix. 
 
Table 1  
Descriptive statistics of research variables 
Variable  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Standard deviation 
Information asymmetry  0.0007  5.812  1.797  0.945 
The number of members who are not responsible  0  6  2.85  1.264 
Institutional Ownership  0  0.98  0.417  0.334 
Ownership concentration  0.24  0.99  0.726  0.178 
Company size  3.821  8.249  5.79  0.6354 
Sales growth  -0.667  2.152  0.184  0.3018 
Profitability  -0.657  0.955  0.152  0.187 
Financial Leverage  0.0006  0.574  0.0888  0.0987 
 
Table 2  
Pearson correlation coefficient matrix 
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Information asymmetry  1             
Ownership concentration  0.3(0.00)  1           
Financial leverage  0.03(0.19)  0.278(0.00)  1         
The  number  of  members  who 
are not responsible 
0.412(0.00)  0.297(0.00)  0.337(0.000) 
 
1       
Institutional shareholders  0.379(0.00)  0.337(0.00)  0.398(0.000)  0.301(0.000)  1     
profitability  -0.046(0.30)  0.046(0.30)  0.007(0.871)  -0.028(0.520) 
 
0.048(0.28)  1   
Sales growth  0.398(0.00)  0.305(0.00)  0.405(0.000)  0.254(0.000)  0.599(0.00)  0.008(0.857)  1 
Company size  0.424(0.00)  0.221(0.00)  0.212(0.000)  0.201(0.000)  0.365(0.00)  -0.147(0.00)  0.298(0.00) 
   1834
As it can be seen, the sign of the relationship of the number of members who are not responsible and 
the percentage of institutional shareholders with the variable of information asymmetry is positive 
and  significant,  and  the  direction  of  the  ownership  concentration  relationship  with  information 
asymmetry variable is negative and significant. Variables of sales growth and firm size also have a 
significant  and  positive  relationship  with  information  asymmetry  and  profitability  variable  has 
negative  relationship  but  insignificant  and  financial  leverage  had  positive  but  insignificant 
relationship with information asymmetry.  
 
According to Pearson correlation coefficients, it can be said that the first hypothesis, which expresses 
a significant relation between the number of board members who are not responsible and information 
asymmetry; the second hypothesis is based on the significant relationship between the percentage of 
institutional shareholders ownership; and the third hypothesis based on the significant relationship 
between ownership concentration and information asymmetry are approved. 
 
The results of the model analysis are shown in Table 3. According to the results listed in Table 3, 
except  for  a  significant  level  of  profitability  and  financial  leverage  level  control  variables,  the 
significance of other variables is less than 0.05. So, all three  hypotheses, which claimed there is 
significant  relationship  between  the  mechanisms  of  corporate  governance  and  information 
asymmetry, are confirmed. Among the mechanisms of corporate governance, the relationship of the 
number of  board  members who  are  not responsible  and  institutional ownership with  asymmetric 
information  is positive  and  significant, and ownership  concentration  has  negative  and significant 
relationship with information asymmetry. According to Durbin-Watson statistics, it can be realized 
that error terms are not correlated. Determining factor shows the strength of the resulting independent 
variables  in explaining the dependent  variable. According to  the  F statistics, one  realizes that the 
regression model is significant. 
  
Table 3  
Results of fitted model 
Dependent variable: information asymmetry  Coefficient   t Statistics   Sig.  
Constant factor  -0.685  -1.805  0.0716 
Profitability  0.024322   0.132503   0.8946  
Company size  0.355522   6.842383   0.000  
Sales growth  0.410533   3.752264   0.0002  
Financial Leverage  0.476169   1.401740   0.1616  
The number of members who are not responsible  0.175  6.352  0.000 
Ownership concentration  -0.412657   -2.185461  0.0293  
Shares  Institutional owners.  0.043447   2.921728   0.0206  
F-statistics = 38.59628 P-Value = 0.000 Durbin-Watson statistics = 1.8575552 Adjusted R-Square =0.343491 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The results of this study showed that there was a positive and significant relationship between the 
number of board members who are not responsible and institutional ownership on the one hand and 
information asymmetry on the other. It means by increasing the number of board members who are 
not responsible and institutional ownership, information asymmetry increases. In addition, research 
shows that  there  was  a  significant  negative  relationship  between  ownership  concentration  and 
information  asymmetry. It  means;  as  the  concentration  of  ownership  increases,  the  degree  of 
information asymmetry of companies reduces. The positive relationship obtained between the number 
of board members who are not responsible and asymmetry of information in this study contradicts 
with the results of Hillier and Mac Kolgan (2006), Kanagartenam et al. (2007), Holm and Schøler 
(2010) who found that the independence of board of directors reduces information asymmetry.  In 
this research, the managers who are not responsible are those who would not wish to act as executive, 
and  it  is  supposed  that  they  were  independent  of  the  firm  while  they  may  not  be.  Therefore, H. Salehi et al.  / Management Science Letters 4 (2014) 
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traditional differences in defining executive managers and without responsibility may be unable to 
determine potential benefit contradictions between managers without responsibility and the company 
in whose board they are involved. 
 
The positive relationship between institutional ownership and information asymmetry found in this 
study is consistent with the results of Heflin and Shaw (2000), O’Neil and Swisher (2003) and Fehleh 
(2004)  who  found  that  bigger  institutional  ownership  was  associated  with  bigger  information 
asymmetry. Note  that  Rahimian  et  al.  (2009)  did  not  find  any  significant  relationship  between 
institutional ownership and information asymmetry. The negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and information asymmetry found in this study is consistent with the results of Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997), Perotti and Thadden (2003), Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) and Florackis and 
Ozkan (2009) who found that large shareholders could reduce information asymmetry and improve 
long-term performance. In the end, it is worth mentioning that due to improper use of governance 
mechanisms  in  Iran,  some  of  these  mechanisms  do  not  have  the  necessity  efficiency  to  reduce 
information asymmetry. 
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